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Abstract
Signcryption is basically a cryptographic primitive which provides both signature
and encryption functions simultaneously, but it is not useful when only one of the
function is required. Generalized Signcryption (GSC) is a special cryptographic
primitive which can provide Signcryption function when security and authenticity
are needed simultaneously, and can also provide encryption or signature function
separately when any one of them is needed. The rst Generalized Signcryption
was proposed in 2006 by Han et al. Since then many Generalized Signcryption has
been proposed based on ECDLP, based on Bilinear Pairing, Identity based and
some are also proposed in Certicateless environment. Majority of the Generalized
Signcryption schemes uses Random Oracle Model for their security proof and few
are proposed based on Standard model.
In this thesis we have surveyed the existing GSC schemes and compare their
security properties and eciency. Along with this we also have proposed two
schemes of which rst one is an Identity based Generalized Signcryption Scheme
and second one is a Certicateless Generalized Signcryption Scheme which is a
variation of Certicateless Signcryption Scheme by Barbosa et al. We begin by
giving formal denition of GSC primitive and complete with comparative study
with other models. Finally, we look ahead at what future progress might be made
in the eld.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the era of information we are living, information about every aspect of life has to
be kept. Information is like an asset, which has a value like other asset. As an asset
it has to be secured from threats and attacks. To keep secure, information needs to
be hidden from unauthorized access (condentiality), protected from unauthorized
change (Integrity), and available to authorized entity when needed (Availability)
[1]. With the growth of computer networks and Internet, information now a day
becomes distributed. So not only information needs to be condential when it is
stored in computer, its condentiality should also be maintained when it is being
transmitted from one computer to another.
Two of the most important functions of modern cryptography are
condentiality and data integrity. Condentiality can be achieved by encryption
techniques, whereas integrity can be provided by the use of authentication
techniques. Encryption technique falls into two broad categories: private key
encryption and public key encryption [2]. Similarly, authentication techniques can
be categorized by private key authentication and public key digital signatures.
In private (symmetric) key cryptography, a secret has to be shared between
participants before any communication, which is infeasible for a large community.
In asymmetric (public) key cryptography, the secret is personal (unshared); each
party creates and keeps its own secret. The public key cryptography is best suited
for some applications like: authentication and digital signature. Whenever an
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application is based on personal secret, public key cryptography needs to be used.
However, public key encryption is slower than symmetric key encryption. In public
key cryptography any message that are encrypted using public key can only be
decrypted by applying the same algorithm, but using the matching private key.
Similarly any message that is signed by a private key can only be veried by
matching public key. To check authentication of the message (proof of origin) the
sender has to sign the message before it gets delivered to the recipient. Message
condentiality and senders authentication in the open channel is a basic and
important need of Internet technology. Until before decade message encryption
and digital signature have been viewed as important but distinct building blocks of
various cryptographic systems. In public key schemes the traditional method is to
digitally sign the message then encrypt it and send it to the recipient. The recipient
will decrypt the message and check the authenticity of the message. This two-step
sequential approach is called \Signature-then-Encryption". Disadvantage of this
approach is that any arbitrary composition cannot guarantee security. This
approach also has low eciency and cost is sum of authentication and encryption.
Signcryption [3] provides the solution to this problem by combining both the
functionalities into a single logical step. A Signcryption scheme simultaneously
fullls the security attributes of an encryption and those of a digital signature.
Though signcryption is ecient to provide both signature and encryption functions
simultaneously, it will not be useful in scenarios where sometimes we need
only one function separately and sometimes both the function jointly. One
solution [4] to this is to combine signcryption with other signature and encryption
module. That means applications must contain at least three cryptographic
primitives (Signcryption, Signature and Encryption), which will be infeasible
in some resource-constrained environments like: embedded systems, sensor
networks, and ubiquitous computing. Solution to the problem is Generalized
Signcryption [5] ,which is a cryptographic primitive that can work as an encryption
scheme or a signature scheme as per the need. In other words without any
additional modication and computation, it provides double functions when the
condentiality and the authenticity are required simultaneously or separately.
2
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1.1 Message Encryption:
Encryption is the process of converting a message from comprehensive (readable)
form into an incomprehensive form and back again at the receiver end, rendering
it unreadable by interceptors or eavesdroppers without secret knowledge (key).
The sequence of data processing steps required for the transformation of plaintext
into cipher text is called message encryption. Encryption algorithms are broadly
of two types: private key encryption (e.g. AES, DES) and public key encryption
(e.g. RSA).
1.2 Message authentication:
Message authentication allows one party (sender) to send a message to another
party (receiver) in such a way that if the message is modied en-route the
receiver will almost detect this message. Message authentication(called Data
origin authentication)is said to protect the integrity of a message ensuring that
each message it has received and accepted is in the same condition that it was
sent out with no bits inserted, missing or modied. Authentication techniques
are broadly of two types: private key authentication (e.g. MAC) and public key
digital signatures (e.g. DSS, ECDSA).
1.3 Digital signature:
A digital signature is a mathematical scheme for ensuring the authenticity of a
digital message or document. A valid digital signature gives a recipient reason
to believe that the message was created by a known sender, such that the sender
cannot deny having sent the message (authentication and non-repudiation) and
that the message was not altered in transit (integrity). Digital signatures are
commonly used for software distribution, nancial transactions, and in other cases
where it is important to detect forgery or tampering. The following Figure 1.1
shows the basics of a digital signature scheme [1].
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Figure 1.1: Digital Signature Process
Digital signatures cannot provide condentiality for the message. If
condentiality is needed, a cryptosystem must be applied over digital signature
scheme.
1.4 Signature-Then-Encryption:
This is the traditional method to achieve both condentiality and authenticity,
by serial composition of signature and encryption algorithms. This is a two-step
approach in which, before a message is sent out, the sender of the message would
sign it using a digital signature scheme, and then encrypt the message (and
signature) using a private key encryption algorithm under a randomly chosen
message encryption key [4]. The random message encryption key would then
be encrypted using the recipients public key. The process [6] is shown in the
Figure 1.2 . This two-step-approach not much ecient than applying signature
and encryption individually.
1.5 Signcryption:
Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive proposed by Yuliang Zheng in 1997,
which achieves condentiality and authenticity in a single logical step. Compared
with traditional methods, it has less computational complexity and computational
complexity. Signcryption has found many applications such as electronic
transactions protocol, mobile agent protocol, key management and routing
protocol.
4
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Figure 1.2: (a) Signature-Then-Encryption (b) Decryption-Then-Verication
1.6 Generalized Signcryption:
Generalized Signcryption [7]proposed by Yiliang Han is a cryptographic primitive
which can work as an encryption scheme or a signature scheme or a signcryption
scheme as per the need. In other words without any additional modication and
computation, it provides double functions when condentiality and authenticity
are required simultaneously and the separate encryption or signature function
when one of them is required.
A Generalized Signcryption scheme is a two-party cryptographic protocol. The
syntax is as follows [8]:
Denition (Generalized Signcryption): A Generalized Signcryption scheme
GSC = (Gen; SC;DSC) consists of three algorithms. (SKU ; PKU)  
Gen(U; 1k)is a randomized keys generation algorithm, takes a secure parameter
k and generates a pair of keys for user U. SKU is the private key and PKU is
the public key.   SC(m;SKS; PKR) is a probabilistic signcryption algorithm.
For any message m, the sender S and the receiver R, it outputs a ciphertext .
m [ ?  DSC(; SKR; PKS) is a deterministic designcryption algorithm.
Where, ENC = (Gen;Enc;Dec)is an encryption scheme. "  
Enc(m;PKR).m  Dec("; SKR). Enc is an encryption algorithm. Dec is a
corresponding decryption algorithm.
5
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It can be clearly observed that, generalized signcryption provides three
functionalities (Signcryption, Signature, Encryption) by using a generic primitive
instead of switching to several subroutines.
1.7 Thesis Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 discusses various literature survey works related to the thesis.
The Survey has been categorized into four groups of Generalized Signcryption
Schemes-Elliptic Curve based Schemes, Bilinear pairing based Schemes, Identity
based Schemes and Certicateless Schemes.
Chapter 3 describes about the mathematical preliminaries that are required for
the implementation of the proposed scheme. It also discusses the hash functions
and Elliptic curve cryptosystems.
Chapter 4 discussed the rst proposed scheme named-a modied Identity
based generalized signcryption scheme in details. The computational and
implementational complexities are compared with other existing Signcryption and
Generalized Signcryption schemes.
Chapter 5 discussed the second proposed scheme namedan improved
Certicateless generalized signcryption schemes in details. The computational,
communicational and implementational complexities are compared with other
existing signcryption and generalized signcryption schemes.
Chapter 6 discusses the concluding remarks with the future scope.
6
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Literature Review
2.1 Related Work
Condentiality and Integrity are two major requirements in any computer
and communication systems. Generally these requirements are achieved by
encryption and signature in public key cryptography. Traditionally, these two
have been treated as independent entities. However these two basic cryptographic
techniques can be combined together in dierent ways like: sign-then-encrypt,
encrypt-then-sign and sign and encrypt etc. in many application to ensure
privacy and authenticity simultaneously. The method is used in some famous
security protocols like secure sockets layer (SSL), internet Protocol Security
(IPsec), and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). Unfortunately, the method is not
practical for two reasons. First, it has low eciency and cost is sum of the
authentication and encryption. Second, not all schemes can guarantee the security.
To enhance the eciency, in 1997 Zheng [3] proposed a novel cryptographic
primitive called \Signcryption" which achieves condentiality and authenticity
in a single logical step. Compared with the available traditional methods,
signcryption has less computational complexity, less communication complexity
and less implementation complexity. Signcryption has found many applications
such as electronic transactions protocol, mobile agent protocol, key management
and routing protocol, key management and routing protocol. In 2002, Baek
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et al. [9] rst formalized and dened security notions for signcryption. Many
Signcryption schemes have been proposed based on RSA problem [10,11] based on
Die-Hellman problem libert2004ecient,bao1998signcryption, based on Bilinear
Maps [12, 13]. Depending on construction techniques Hybrid Signcryption and
parallel Signcryption are also designed. Signcryption schemes for multi-receiver
are also designed. Signcryption schemes for multi-receiver are also designed which
targets application like broadcast signcryption, Multicast Signcryption etc. some
signcryption schemes with additional properties are designed like identity based
signcryption [5] and group signcryption [14] and so on.
Though traditional signcryption is ecient to provide both Signature and
Encryption functions simultaneously it will not be useful in scenarios where
sometimes we need only one function and sometimes we need both simultaneously.
In fact, not all messages require both secrecy and authenticity. Some message need
to be may need to be signed only, while some others need to be encrypted only.
Zheng suggested that signcryption is replaced with other signature or encryption
algorithms to resolve the problem. So, applications must contain at least three
cryptographic primitive (signcryption, signature, and encryption), which will be
in-feasible in some resource-constrained environments like :embedded systems,
sensor networks and ubiquitous computing where it will not be aordable to
use three dierent schemes to achieve condentiality and authenticity separately
or simultaneously. Motivated by this, in 2006 Yiliang Han [15] proposed a
new primitive called Generalized signcryption, which can work as an encryption
scheme or a signature scheme or a Signcryption as need. In other words without
any additional modication and computation, it provides double functions when
the condentiality and the authenticity are required simultaneously , and the
separate encryption or signature function when one of them is required. The
rst generalized signcryption scheme named ECGSC (elliptic curve generalized
signcryption) is based on ECDLP. Wang et al. [16] gave the formal security
model for a Generalized Signcryption scheme and modied the scheme proposed
in [15]. Following this many Generalized signcryption schemes has been
proposed including some of the standard Generalized Signcryption like IDGSC
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(ID based Generalized Signcryption), BPGSC (Bilinear Pairing based Generalized
Signcryption), CLGSC ( Certicateless Generalized Signcryption) etc. Some of
the Generalized Schemes are also proposed for Multiuser model like [5, 17]. Form
majority of the schemes, formal security model is based on Random Oracle Model
and for few schemes, security model are based on Standard model [18].
2.2 Identity based cryptosystems:
Identity based cryptosystem was introduced by Shamir in 1984 [19]. The central
idea here is to use any string as a public key. In particular this string may be the
email address, telephone number, social security number or any publicly available
parameter of a user that is unique to him. The corresponding private key can
only be derived by a trusted Private Key Generator(PKG) which keeps a master
secret that is use to derive the private keys. So this greatly relieves the burden
of public key management and provides a more convenient alternative to Public
Key Infrastructure(PKI). The major disadvantage of Identity based cryptosystem
is the key escrow problem [2], where a untrusted PKG will have the power to forge
signatures in the name of any user of the system, as well as the ability to decrypt
all of their private communications.
2.3 Certicateless Cryptography
Certicateless Cryptography was introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [20]
that avoids drawbacks of both traditional PKI and Identity based cryptosystems
and acheives the best of both: it inherits from identity-based techniques a
solution to the certicate management problem and also removes the secret
key escrow problem inherent to the identity based systems. The idea was
to combine the functionality of a public key scheme with that of an identity
based scheme. User encryption and verication keys contain both a user
identity and an unauthenticated public key. Similarly, user secret keys are
constructed from two partial secrets: one coming from an identity-based trusted
9
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authority called Key Generation Center(KGC) and another generated by the user.
2.4 Framework of ID based generalized
Signcryption Schemes
The Algorithm for a generic Identity Based Signcryption scheme IDGSC = (Setup,
KeyGenration, GSC, GUSC) consists of four algorithms which are:
• Setup (1k): This is a randomized algorithm run by PKG. Given a security
parameter k, this algorithm generates the system parameters params and
master secret key s and master public key mpk.
• KeyGenration (mpk;msk; ID): On input ID, PKG uses it to compute a
pair of corresponding public/private keys (SU ; QU).
• GSC: To send a message m from Sender S to the Receiver R, this
algorithm takes input (SS; IDR;m) and outputs signcrypted text  =
MIDGSC(SS; IDR;m).
{ When IDS 6= ID; IDR 6= ID;   GSC(SS; QR;m) =
SC(SS; QR;m)
{ When IDS 6= ID; IDR = ID;   GSC(SS; QR;m) = Sign(SS;m)
{ When IDS = ID; IDR 6= ID;   GSC(SS; QR;m) =
Encrypt(QR;m)
• GUSC: This algorithm takes input (IDS; SR; ) and outputs m if  is a
valid Generalized Signcryption done by Sender S for Receiver R, otherwise
output false (?) if is not valid.
{ When IDS 6= ID; IDR 6= ID;m  GUSC(QS; SR; ) =
USC(QS; SR; )
10
Chapter 2 Literature Review
{ When IDS 6= ID; IDR = ID; (T;?)  GUSC(QS; SR; ) =
V erify(SS; )
{ When IDS = ID; IDR 6= ID;m  GUSC(QS; SR; ) =
Decrypt(QR; )
The absence of specic sender or receiver are denoted by ID; ID instead of
IDS; IDR. When there is no specic sender(ID) we only encrypt the message m
using MIDGSC, when information about sender is not needed MIDGSC becomes
signature scheme and when both are there it will work as Signcryption scheme.
Figure 2.1: Identity Based Signcryption
2.5 Framework Certicateless Generalized
Signcryption Schemes
This scheme consists of six algorithms. First four of which are used for key
management operations.
1. Setup(1k):This is a global setup algorithm, which takes input the security
parameter 1k and returns the KGC's secret key msk and global parameters
params including a master public key mpk. This algorithm is executed by
the KGC, which publishes params.
2. Extract-partial-private-key (IDU ;msk; params): An algorithm which
takes input msk, params and a user identity IDU 2 f0; 1g and returns a
partial private key DU . This algorithm is run by KGC, after verifying the
users identity.
11
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3. Generate-User-Keys (IDU ; params): An algorithm which takes input as
an identity and the public parameters and outputs a secret value x and a
public key PK. This algorithm is run by a user to obtain a public key and a
secret value which will be used for constructing full private key. The public
key is published without certication.
4. Set-Private-Key (DU ; x; params): A deterministic algorithm which takes
as input a partial secret key DU and a secret value x and returns the full
private key SU . This algorithm is run by a user to construct a full private
key.
5. CLGSC (m;SS; IDR): This algorithm has three scenarios: signcryption
mode, signature only mode and encryption only mode.
• Signcryption Mode: If sender S transmits wants to transmit
a message m to receiver B such that both condentially and
authentication need to be maintained then the input is (m;SS; IDR),
and output is  = CLGSC(m;SS; IDR) = Singcrypt(m;SS; IDR).
• Signature only Mode: If sender S wants to send message m without
denite receiver, the input is (m;SS; ID), where ID means receiver
is null, the output is = CLGSC(m;SS; ID) = sign(m;SS).
• Encryption only Mode: If someone wants to send a message m to
a denite receiver R condentially, the input is (m;S; IDR), where S
means the receiver is null, the output is = encrypt(m; IDR).
6. CLGDSC (; IDS; IDR): After receiving , if it is valid, the receiver R
designcrypts (or decrypts) the ciphertext and returns the message m and
(or) the signature on m by S, otherwise return (?) means false.
12
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2.6 Comparison of Existing Generalized
Signcryption Schemes:
The works on Generalized Signcryption till date can be broadly classied into be
four categories like:
1. Elliptic Curve Based Schemes
• ECGSC:Elliptic Curve-Based Generalized Signcryption by Yiliang Han
[7] in 2006.
• Generalized Signcryption Scheme Based on short ECDSA by Zhang et
al. [21] in 2010.
• Provable Secure Generalized Signcryption Scheme by Wang et al. [16]
in 2010. security model by Han is not correct, and proposed the formal
security model.
2. Bilinear Pairing Based Schemes
• BPGSC: Bilinear Pairing based Generalized Signcryption by Han et
al. [8]in 2009. Also proposed hybrid BPGSC to transmit large data
streams.
3. ID Based Schemes
• IDGSC : ID based Generalized Signcryption by Lal et al. [22] in 2008 , based
on Boneh-Franklin ID-based encryption.
• Generalization of Barreto et al. ID based Signcryption Scheme by Lal et
al. [23]in 2008.
• NIDGSC: Provable Secure ID based Generalized Signcryption Scheme by Yu
et al. [24]in 2010.
• IBGSC: An ecient Identity Based Generalized Signcryption Scheme by
Kushwah et al. [25]in 2011.
4. Certicateless environment
13
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• CLGSC: Certicateless Generalized Signcryption by Ji et al. [26] in 2010.
• Ecient Generalized Signcryption Scheme by Kushwah et al. [27] in 2010.
• Provable Secure Certicateless Generalized Signcryption Scheme by
Kushwah et al. in 2012.
• N-CLGSC Provable Certicateless Generalized Signcryption Scheme by
Zhou et al. [28] in 2012.
The following Table 2.1 shows the comparison of Elliptic curve based
Generalized Signcryption Schemes with other existing Signcryption schemes.
Table 2.1: Comparison of Computational Cost
Schemes KG S D
SCS 2E 1E+1I 2E
ECSCS 2kP 1kP+1I 2kP
B&D 2E 2E+1I 3E
SC-DSA 2E 2E+2I 3E+1I
ECGSC 2kP 2kP+1I 3kP+1I
The Table 2.2 below shows the comparison of ID based and Certicateless
signcryption schemes with other existing signcryption schemes.
M: number of point multiplications in G1; E: number of exponentiation in G2;
P:number of pairing computations; (+): pre-computation of pairing.
2.7 Observation
The Generalized Signcryption schemes are capable of providing multiple
functionalities with comparable cost as compared to the normal Signcryption
schemes. Some times the cost is bit more than signcryption schemes that is because
of the additional functionalities that they provides.
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Table 2.2: Comparison of Computational Cost
Schemes
Signcryption UnSigncryption
M E P M E P
Malone Lee 3 0 0(+) 1 0 3(+1)
Nalla-Ready 2 1 1 0 1 3
Libert-Quisquater 2 0 0(+2) 1 0 4
X. Boyen 3 1 0(+1) 2 0 3(+1)
IDGSC 5 0 0(+1) 1 0 3(+1)
NIDGSC 3 1 0(+1) 0 2 2(+2)
Bareto based GSC 2 1 0 0 1 2
IBGSC 2 2 0 1 or 0 1 or 0 2 or 1
CLGSC 3 2 0 1 1 2
Ecient CLGSC 2 3 0 1 3 2
NCLGSC 1 4 0(+1) 0 1 4(+1)
2.8 Motivation
Encryption and Signature are fundamental tools in public key environment for
providing condentiality and authenticity respectively. Traditionally they are
provided by Sequential composition. When applications need both functionalities
simultaneously, Solution is Signcryption. Applications may need the two
functionalities Simultaneously or may be separately without increasing complexity.
Specically in Resource constrained environments such as Sensor networks,Mobile
Computing, and smart card based applications cannot aord separate modules for
achieving both functionalities.
2.9 Objective of Research
1. To design a Multi functional Generalized Signcryption in Identity Based
Cryptosytems for application in Resourse constarined environment.
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2. To design a Multi functional Generalized Signcryption in certicateless
environment to avoid Key Escrow problem.
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Mathematical Background
3.1 Mathematics of Cryptology
The basic properties of modular arithmetic, groups, rings, elds, fundamentals of
elliptic curves, Bilinear mappings, cryptographic hash functions are discussed in
this Chapter.
3.1.1 Modular Arithmetic
Set of Residues: Zn
The result of the modulo operation with modulus n is always an integer between
0 and n-1. The modulo operation creates a set, which in modular arithmetic is
referred to as the set of least residue moduli n, Zn. The Set Zn and its 3 instances
are shown below
Zn=f0, 1, 2, .(n-1)g
Z2= f0, 1g,
Z6= f0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5g,
Z11= f0 1 , 2, 3 , 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10g
Additive Inverses
In Zn, two numbers a and b are additive inverses of each other if a+ b  0(modn).
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In Zn additive inverse of a can be calculated as b = n   a. For example , the
additive inverse of 4 in Zn is 10  4 = 6.
Multiplicative Inverse
In Zn, two numbers are multiplicative inverses of each other if a  b  1(modn).
For example in Zn, the multiplicative inverse of 3 is 7.
The integer a inZn has a multiplicative inverse if and only if gcd(n; a)  1(modn).
In this case, a and n are said to be relatively prime. For example, there is no
multiplicative inverse of 8 in Z10 because gcd(8; 10) = 2 6= 1.
Some new Sets
1. Zn
: The set,Zn is a subset of Zn and includes only integers in Zn that have
a unique multiplicative inverse.
Each member Zn has an additive inverse, but only some members have a
multiplicative inverse. Each member of Zn
 has a multiplicative inverse, but
only some members have a multiplicative inverse.
Example:
Z6= f0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5g Z6= f1, 5g
Z7= f0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6g Z7= f1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6g
Z10= f0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9g Z10= f1, 3, 7, 9g
2. Zp: The set Zp is same as Zn except that n is a prime. Zp contains all
integers from 0 to p-1. Each member in Zp has an additive inverse; each
member except 0 has multiplicative inverse. Note: We need to use Zn when
additive inverses are needed; we need to use Zn
 when multiplicative inverses
are needed.
3. Zp
: The Set Zp is same as Zn except that n is prime. Zp contains
all integers from 1 to p-1. Each member in Zp
 has an additive and
multiplicative inverse. Zp
 is a very good candidate when we need a set
that supports both additive and multiplicative inverse.
Example:
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Z13= f0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12g
Z13
= f1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12g
3.1.2 Mathematics of Symmetric key Cryptography
Algebraic Structures:
Cryptography requires sets of integers and specic operations that are dened for
those sets. The combination of the set and the operations that are applied to the
elements of the set is called an algebraic structure. Some of the common algebraic
structures: groups, rings, and elds.
Grouos: A group G is a set of elements with a binary operation \" that satises
four properties .
1. Closure: if x and y are the elements of G, then z = x  y is also an element
of G.
2. Associativity: If x, y and z are elements of G, then (x  y)  z = x  (y  z).
3. Existence of identity: For all x in G, there exist an element e, called the
Identity element, such that e  x = x  e = x.
4. Existence of inverse: For each x in G, there exist an element x, called the
inverse of x, such that x  x0 = x0  x = e.
Along with those properties if it also satises the commutative property then it
is called as Commutative group or Abelian group. Commutativity means for all
x and y in G, we have x  y = y  x
Order of a Group: The order of a group, jGj, is the number of elements in the
group. If the group is not nite, its order is innite; if the group is nite, the order
is nite.
Subgroups: A Subset H of a group G is a subgroup of G if H itself is a group
with respect to the operation on G. In other words, if G =< S;  > is a group,
H =< T;  > is a group under the same operation, and T is a nonempty subset
of S, then H is a subgroup of G. The above denition implies that:
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1. If x and y are the members of both groups, then z = x  y is also a member
of both groups.
2. The groups share the same identity element.
3. If x is a member of both groups, the inverse of x is also a member of both
groups.
4. The group made of the identity element of G;H =< e;  >, is a subgroup of
G.
5. Each group is a subgroup of itself.
Cyclic Subgroups: If a subgroup of a group can be generated using the
power of an element, the subgroup is called the cyclic subgroup. The term power
here means repeatedly applying the group operation to the element: xn = x  x 
x  :::::::::(n times) The set made from this process is referred to as < a >.
Cyclic Groups: A cyclic group is a group that is its own cyclic subgroup.
The element that generates the cyclic subgroup can also generate the group itself.
This element is referred to as a generator. If g is a generator the, the elements in
a nite cyclic group can be written as fe; g; g2; :::gn 1g, where gn = e. A cyclic
group can have many generators. Example: The group G =< Z6;+ > is a cyclic
group with two generators, g = 1 and g = 5 The group G =< Z10; > is a cyclic
group with two generators, g=3 and g=7.
Lagrange's Theorem: The order of a subgroup (jHj) divides the order of the
group (jGj). This implies the number of subgroup of a group can be easily
determined by the divisors of order of a group (jGj). Given, the order of the
group G =< Z17;+ > is 17. The only divisors of 17 are 1 and 17. This means this
group can have two subgroups, H1 with the identity element and H2 = G.
Order of an Element: The order of an element a in a group, ord(a), is the
smallest integer n such that an = e. This also implies that, the order of an
element is the order of the cyclic group it generates.
Ring: A ring denoted as R =< :::; ;2 >, is an algebraic structure with two
operations. The rst operation must satisfy all ve properties required for an
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abelian group. The second operation must satisfy only rst two properties (Closure
and Associativity). In addition the second operation must be distributed over
the rst. Distributivity means that for all x, y and z elements of R, we have
x2(y  z) = (x2y)  (x2z) and (x  y)2z = (x2z)  (y2z).
A ring is said to be a commutative ring if the second operation also satises
the Commutativity property.
Field: A Field, denoted by F =< f:::g; ;2 > is a commutative ring in which the
second operation satises all ve properties dened for the rst operation except
that the identity of the rst operation(zero element) has no inverse.
Finite Fields: Only nite elds are extensively used in cryptography. Galois
showed that for a eld to be nite the number of elements should be pn, where p
is a prime and n is a positive integer. The nite elds are usually called Galois
elds and denoted as GF (pn).
A Galois Field, GF (P n), is a nite eld with pn elements.
GF (p) Fields: When n=1, we have GF (p) eld. This eld can be the set
Zp = f0; 1; 2; :::p 1g, with two arithmetic operations , addition and multiplication.
GF (2n) Fields: When we work with computers, the positive integers are stored
in the computer as n-bit words in which n is usually 8, 16, 32, 64, and so on. This
means the range of integers is 0 to 2n and the modulus is 2n. The elements in the
set are n bit words. For example for n=3, the set is f000; 001; :::111g.
3.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem
Elliptic Curve (EC) systems as applied to cryptography was applied to
cryptography was rst proposed in 1985 independently by Neal Koblitz and Victor
Miller. The Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem is based on the theory of Elliptic Curves.
3.2.1 Denition of Elliptic Curves
An Elliptic curve over a nite eld K is a non-singular cubic curve in two variables,
f(x; y) = 0 with a rational point (which may be a point at innity). The eld K
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is usually taken to be the complex numbers, reals, rationals, algebraic extensions
of rationals, p-adic numbers or a nite eld. By, non-singular means all 3 roots of
EC must be distinct rootsnodoubleroots.
3.2.2 General form of an EC:
An elliptic curve is a plane curve dened by an equation of the form y2 = x3+ax+b
Here x is not a continuous point, chosen from a particular eld GF (P ) or GF (2n).
Figure 3.1: Graphical representation of an elliptic curve
• Symmetric over X-axis
• Cubic curve in the variable x
• Although we are actually drawing continuous elliptic curves they are actually
discrete curves (Discrete collection of points).
3.2.3 Why ECC?
One of the main problems of RSA is its demand for a huge key length to meet
the challenges in today's security scenario. Also in every 10 years key size
becomes double. Table 3.1 shows some of the currently used RSA key lengths
by some organizations. A larger key increases the security of the encryption.
But it has a serious problem in practice. With every doubling of the RSA key
length, decryption is about 8 times slower. The size of ciphertext also becomes
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Table 3.1: RSA key length of some organizations
Organization RSA Key length
Google 1024
Facebook 1024
Amazon 2048
eBay 2048
Online SBI 2048
ICICI Bank 2048
Canara Bank 2048
huge considerably. The key length also aects the speed of encryption, which is
slower by a factor of 4. The comparisons in Table 3.2 demonstrate that smaller
parameters can be used in elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) than with RSA
system at a given security level.
Table 3.2: RSA and ECC key sizes
Security Level 80 112 120 128 256
ECC 160 185 237 256 512
RSA 1024 2048 2560 3072 15360
The advantages that can be gained from smaller parameters include speed
(faster computations) and smaller keys and certicates.
3.2.4 Weierstrass Equation
Elliptic curves are a specic class of algebraic curves. Common or more
generalized form of the elliptic curve equation is known as Weierstrass
Equation. The 'Weierstrass form' of an elliptic curve equation is
E : y2 + a1xy + a3 = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x + a6 The Constants a1; a2; a3; a4; a6and
the variables x, y can be complex, real, integers, polynomials, or even any other
eld elements. But in practice we must specify which eld, F, these constants
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and the variables, x, y belong to and  6= 0 where is the discriminant of E
and is dened as follows:  =  d22d8   8d34   27d26 + 9d2d4d6 d2 = a21 + 4a2
d4 = 2a4 + a1a3 d6 = a
2
3 + 4a6 d8 = a
2
1a6 + 4a2a6   a1a3a4 + a2a23   a24 E is dened
over K when the coecients a1; a2; a3; a4; a6 (also the variables x and y) of the
equations come from the elements of the eld K. So sometimes it can be written
E (K) to emphasize that E is dened over K, and K is called the underlying eld.
Two special Galois elds are common in Elliptic Curve Cryptography. They are
GF (p) and GF (2n).
3.2.5 Elliptic Curve Over Prime Galois Fields
An elliptic group over a prime Galois Field uses a special elliptic curve of the
formy2(modp) = x3+ax+ b(modp) Where a; b 2 GF (p),0  x  p and  16(4a3+
27b2)mod p 6= 0 . The constants a and b are non-negative integers smaller than
the prime p. The condition that  16(4a3 + 27b2)modp 6= 0 implies that the curve
has no \singular points".
3.2.6 Group Law
The mathematical property that makes elliptic curves useful for cryptography is
simply that if we take two (distinct) points on the curve, then the chord joining
them intercepts the curve in a third point (because we have a cubic curve). If that
point is reected in the x-axis we get another point on the curve (since the curve is
symmetric about the x-axis). This is the "sum" of the rst two points. Together
with this addition operation, the set of points E (K) forms an abelian group with
O serving as its identity. It is this group that is used in the construction of elliptic
curve cryptographic systems. Algebraic formula for the group law can be derived
from the geometric description. Group law for y2 = x3 + ax+ b over GF (p)
1. Identity: P +O = O + P = P for all P 2 E(K).
2. Negative: If P = (x; y) 2 E(K), then (x; y) + (x; y) = O. The point
24
Chapter 3 Mathematical Background
(x; y) is denoted by  P and is called the negative of P; note that  P is
indeed a point in E(K). Also, O = O.
3. Point addition: Let P (x1; y1) 2 E(K) and Q(x2; y2) 2 E(K) where P 6= Q.
Then P +Q = R(x3; y3), where x3 = 
2   x1   x2 ,y3 = (x1   x3)  y1 and
 = (y2   y1)=(x2   x1).
4. Point doubling: Let P (x1; y1) 2 E(K) , where P 6= P . Then 2P = R(x3; y3)
where x3 = 
2   2x1, y3 = (x1   x3)  y1 and  = ((3x21 + a))=(2y1)
3.2.7 Geometrical Interpretation of Group Law
1. Negative of a Point: Let's take a point P = (x; y). The formula for nding
-P is  P = (x; y) as shown in the g. 1.
2. Addition of two Points: As mentioned above, the addition of any two points
on an elliptic curve can dened by drawing a line between the two points
and nding the point at which the line intersects the curve. The negative of
the intersection point is dened as the "elliptic sum" by mathematicians as
shown in g. 2.
3. Doubling of a Point: If P (x1; y1), then the double of P, denoted by, R(x3; y3),
is dened as follows. First draw the Tangent line to the elliptic curve at P.
This line intersects the elliptic curve in a second point. Then R is the
reection of this point in the x-axis.
ECC in cryptography: Like RSA has exponentiation, ECC has point
multiplication (repeated addition of two points) as its underlying mathematical
operation. Scalar Multiplication: Scalar , Base point P then P = P + P +
P + :: + P (times). A base point B is taken from the elliptic group (similar to
generators used in other cryptosystems). Private Key: an integer x, selected from
the interval [1; p   1]. Public key: Q = x  B. Hard Problem of ECC: It is
analogous to discrete log problem. Let Q = kP , where P, Q are points on elliptic
curve.
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Given k; P => \easy"to compute Q.
Given Q;P => \hard" to nd K. this is known as elliptic curve discrete logarithmic problem.
Discrete Logarithmic problem: If g and h are elements of a nite cyclic group
G then a solution x of the equation gx = h is called discrete logarithm to the base
g of h in the group G.
Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem (ECDLP) Let E be an elliptic Curve over the
nite eld Fp. And let P, Q be the points in E(Fp). The Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is the problem of nding n such that Q = nP . The
integer n is denoted as n = logp(Q), the elliptic curve discrete logarithm of Q with
respect to P.
3.2.8 Applications of ECC:
ECC is ideal for devices which are small and have limited storage and
computational power. Like
• Wireless communication devices
• Smart cards
• Online transactions
• Web Servers
• Any application where security is needed but lacks the power, storage and
computational power that is necessary for present day applications.
3.3 Cryptographic Hash Function
3.3.1 Hash Function:
A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic function which maps a string of
arbitrary length to a string of xed length called hashed value (sometimes called
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message digest).
h : f0; 1g ! f0; 1gn
Consider a function f(x) = y that maps x to the image y. The x is said to be the
preimage of y.
The output is called hash value or message digest or simply digest. Here, we
assume y = h(x), where h is a (public domain) hash function, which has to meet
the following requirements:
1. The length of x is arbitrary, while the length of y is constant;
2. For a given x, it is easy to compute y; while, for a given hash value y, it is
hard to nd x to satisfy y = h(x);
3. It is computationally unfeasible to nd two dierent inputs x and x and
h(x) = h(x).
Cryptographic hash functions are used universally in cryptography; digital
signatures, message authentication codes (MAC), random sequence generators
used in key agreement, authentication protocols etc.
Cryptographic hash functions need to satisfy the following three security
properties:
1. Preimage Resistance: Given a digest y, it is computationally infeasible to
nd a message x that hashes to y. That is, computational cost of nding
the input x must be  2n, where h(x) = y and jyj = n.
Instance: A hash function h : X ! Y and an element y 2 Y .
Find: x 2 X such that h(x) = y.
If the preimage can be solved then (x; y) is a valid pair. A hash function for
which preimage cannot be eciently solved is said to be preimage resistant.
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2. Second Preimage Resistance: Given a message x, it is computationally
infeasible to nd a dierent message x0, such that both messages hash to
a same digest. That is, computational cost of nding the inputx0(6= x) must
be  2n, where h(x0) = y; h(x) = y, and jyj = n.
Instance: A hash function h : X ! Y and an element x 2 X.
Find: x0 2 X such that x0 6= x and h(x0) = h(x).
If the second preimage problem is solved then, the pair (x0; h(x)) is valid.
If it cannot be done eciently then the hash function is second preimage
resistant.
3. Collision Resistance: It is computationally infeasible to nd two dierent
messages, which hash to the same digest. That is, computational cost of
nding an input pairx and x0 such that h(x) = h(x0). Here n the length of
the message digest.
Instance: A hash function h : X ! Y .
Find: x; x0 2 X such that x0 6= x and h(x0) = h(x).
If this collision problem can be solved then if (x, y) is valid pair so is (x, y).
If not eciently solvable the hash function is called collision resistant.
From attacker point of view Collision Resistance is a simple problem, but from
designers point of view, it is a much harder problem.
The preimage resistance property can be expressed as the inability to learn about
the contents of the input data from its digest. The second preimage resistance
property can be interpreted as the inability to learn about the second preimage
from the given rst preimage such that both of these preimages have the same
digest. The collision resistance property signies that the digests are almost unique
for each given message. If the input message is altered, almost always the hash
changes as well. The word almost is used, because when a function maps from
a larger domain to a smaller range, collisions necessarily exist. If cryptographic
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hash functions are designed properly, with digests of sucient length then the
probability that one can obtain two dierent messages with identical hashes is too
small to be bothered in all practical applications.
These three properties preimage resistance, second preimage resistance and
collision resistance are also known as one-way, weak collision resistance, and strong
collision resistance properties respectively. If a hash function satises the rst two
properties then it is referred as one-way hash function (OWHF). Whereas the
hash function that satises all the three properties referred as collision resistant
hash function (CRHF). A hash function with an output of n bits can only oer
a security level of 2n operations for pre-image and second pre-image attacks
and 2n=2 operations against nding collisions. Apart from these properties, it
is expected that a good hash function will satisfy some properties (desirable but
not necessary), they are
• Near-collision resistance: A hash function is said to be near-collision resistant
if it is hard to nd any two messages x and x0 such that x 6= x0 and h(x)
h(x0) =  for small dierence .
• Partial-preimage resistance: A hash function satises this property when the
diculty of nding a partial preimage for a given digest is the same as that
of nding a full preimage using digest. It must also be hard to recover the
whole input even when part of the input is known along with the digest.
A message digest guarantees the integrity of a message. It guarantees that the
message has not been changed. A message digest however does not authenticate
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the sender of the message. The digest created by cryptographic hash function is
normally called a modication detection code (MDC). The code can detect any
modication in the message. There is another type of hash that uses a secret key
that is MAC (message authentication code). Conditions:
• The input X can be of arbitrary length and the resulth(X;K) has a xed
length of n bits. The function has an secondary input the key K, with a
xed length of k bits.
• Given h;K and an input X, the computation of h(K;X) must be easy.
• Given a message X (but with unknown K), it must be `hard' to determine
h(K;X).
3.3.2 Message Authentication Codes(MAC)
MAC is a keyed hash function, used to verify the integrity and authentication
of information. A MAC algorithm take a secret key K of length k and an
arbitrary length message x as input and returns the authentication tag dened
as MAC(K; x) =MACk(x). Given a MAC algorithm MAC and the inputs x and
K, the computation of tagMACk(x) =  of xed size n must be easy. Some of the
cryptographic hash functions use compression function from the scratch. Some of
them are described as follows
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• Message Digest: Several hash algorithms are designed by Ron Rivest. These
are referred as MD2, MD4, and MD5 . The MD5 is the strengthened version
of MD4 that divides the message into blocks of 512 bits and creates a 128-bit
digest. As 128-bit is too small to resist collision attacks so better to go for
Secure hash Algorithms (SHA).
• Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA): The Secure Hash Algorithm is a standard
was developed by NIST and was published as a FIP standard. Its mostly
based on MD5. The standard was revised in 1995, which includes SHA-1.
It is then revised to four new versions: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512. Characteristics of various SHA are shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Characteristics of secure hash algorithms
Characteristics SHA-1 SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512
Maximum Message Size 264   1 264   1 264   1 2128   1 2128   1
Block size 512 512 512 1024 1024
Message Digest Size 160 224 256 384 512
Number of Rounds 80 64 64 80 80
Word Size 32 32 32 64 64
3.3.3 Random Oracle Model:
The Random Oracle Model was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993, is
an ideal mathematical model for a hash function. A function based on this model
behaves as follows.
• When a new message of any length is given, the oracle creates and gives a
xed-length message digest that is a random string of zeros and ones. The
oracle records the message and the message digest.
• When a message is given for which a digest exists, the oracle simply gives
the digest in the record.
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• The digest for a new message needs to be chosen independently from all
previous digests.
It states that the knowledge of the previously computed values does not give any
advantage to the future computations of h(x).
RO is a theoretical model that captures the concept of an ideal hash function.
Random Oracle, models the ideal hash function in a way, that is if you access a
value of say x and which you have never accessed before then you are returning
a random number but if you are accessing something which you have accessed
before then you are returning the same number which you have returned before.
If a hash function, h is ideal then the only way to compute the hash of a given
value is by actually computing it, i.e. even if many previous values are known then
also computing the hash of a new value should not be derivable from the previous
ones.
Non-Ideal hash function:
The new hash values can be computed from pre-computed values, like linear
kind of equation (if you know two points from there you can calculate all the
points). Consider a hash function h : Zn ! Zn which is a linear function,
say h(x; y) = ax + bymodn, a; b 2 Zn; n  2is a positive integer. Suppose
h(x1; y1) = ax1 + by1; h(x2; y2) = ax2 + by2.
h(rx1 + sx2modn; ry1 + sy2modn) = rh1(x1; y1) + sh2(x2; y2)modn, where h1()
and h2() are known. Thus we can compute the hash of another hash value apart
from (x1; y1) and (x2; y2) without actually computing the hash value, means we are
computing the new hash values from pre-computed values even without knowing
the values of a and b. So, these types of hash function are not ideal hash functions
according to the RO model.
The RO model should be such that although suppose we have got a domain say
X and out of them suppose we take any subset X0and suppose we know all the
corresponding hashed output for this X0.
Now if you access a point from XnX0 (X dierence X0), then this hashed outputs
(dotted in gure) should not give you any information about the other hashed
32
Chapter 3 Mathematical Background
outputs.
That means before we started any computation if the probability of any hash
output occurring is 1=M (M is the range), but even after computing X0, the
probability still stays 1=M , we are not able to compute with any better probability.
It states that the knowledge of the previously computed values does not give any
advantage to the future computations of h(x).
3.3.4 Pairing-Based Cryptography:
The central idea behind Pairing-Based Cryptography is the mapping between two
useful cryptographic groups which allows new cryptographic schemes based on
the reduction of one problem in one group to a dierent, usually easier problem
in the other group.
Bilinear Maps:
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P .
Bilinear-Maps are the tool of pairing-based cryptography. They basically establish
relationship between cryptographic groups. Bilinear maps are called pairings
because they associate pairs of elements from G1 and G2 with elements in Gt.
This denition admits degenerate maps which map everything to the identity of
Gt.
Let G1; G2 and Gt be cyclic groups of large prime order q. Generally we write
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G1; G2 additively andGt multiplicatively. A pairing is a mapping e : G1G2 ! Gt,
satisfying the property of Bilinearity, which means the following should hold:
e(aP; bR) = e(P;Q)ab, for all P 2 G1; Q 2 G2 and all a; b 2 Z.
A pairing is admissible if the mapping is also non-degenerate and computable.
Admissible Bilinear Mapping are denoted as. These are the only bilinear maps
used in cryptography . Non-degeneracy means mapping cannot be the trivial map
which sends every pair of elements of G1 and G2 to the identity element of Gt.
Because all are groups of prime order, it follows that if P is a generator of G1 and
q is a generator of G2, then e(P;Q) is a generator of Gt. A mapping is said to be
computable if an algorithm exists which can eciently compute e(P;Q) for any
P;Q 2 G1. If G1 = G2 then the pairing is said to be symmetric. Otherwise it is
said to be asymmetric. If G1 = G2 = Gt then the map is called self-bilinear map
(GG! G).
G1; G2 and Gt are all isomorphic to one another since they have the same order
and are cyclic.
e : G1 G2 ! Gt such that for all u 2 G1; v 2 G2; a; b 2 Z; e(ua; vb) = e(u; v)ab .
The Other Notation: Sometimes G is written multiplicatively. In this case P;Q
normal names for elements of G Bilinear property expressed as 8P;Q 2 G,
8a; b 2 Z; e(Pa;Qb) = e(P;Q)ab .
Bilinear Pairing:
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the
same prime order q. Let P be an arbitrary generator of G1 and a; b be the elements
of Zq . A bilinear pairing is a map.
A bilinear pairing is a map e : G1 G1 ! G2 with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity : for every P;Q;R 2 G1 , we have e(P;Q + R) =
e(P;Q)e(P;R); e(P +Q;R) = e(P;R)e(Q;R)
Consecutively, for any a; b 2 Zq :
e(aP; bQ) = e(P;Q)ab = e(abP;Q) = e(P; abQ) = e(bP;Q)a
e(kP;Q) = e(P; kQ) = e(P;Q)k
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2. Non-Degeneracy: If everything maps to the identity, thats obviously not
desirable. If P is a generator of G1, then e(P; P ) is a generator of G2. In
other words there exist P 2 G1 such that e(P; P ) 6= 1 where 1 is the identity
element of G2.
3. Computability: There exist an ecient algorithm to compute e(P;Q) for
every P;Q 2 G1.
The pairing map e is sometimes called an admissible pairing. A pairing is
admissible if the mapping is also non-degenerate and computable(be).
Denition: Let be : G1  G2 ! Gt be a bilinear map. Let g1; g2 be two
generators of G1; G2 respectively. The map e is an admissible bilinear map if
e(g1; g2) generates Gt and e is eciently computable.
Implication: Since be is bilinear , the map be is also Symmetric.
Proof: Being symmetric means that for any Q;W 2 G1, the equality be(Q;W ) =be(W;Q) holds. Both Q;W 2 G1 can be represented as using some generator P and
some a; b 2 Zq : Let Q = aP and W = bP . Then we have be(Q;W ) = be(aP; bP ) =be(P; P )ab = be(bP; aP ) = be(W;Q).
What groups to use? Typically, G1 is a subgroup of the group of points on
an elliptic curve over a nite eld, i.e. E(Ft). G2 is a subgroup of the multiplicative
group of related nite eld. The Map be is derived by modifying Weil pairing [29]
or Tate pairing [30] on an elliptic curve over Ft. The Computational complexity of
the Tate pairing is less than that of the Weil Pairing. The Weil and Tate pairing
need to be modied because the pairings may always output 1 (2 Gt).
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A Modied ID Based Generalized
Signcryption Scheme(MIDGSC)
In this chapter, we have proposed an identity based signcryption scheme based on
Barellto et al. identity based signcryption scheme [31] and it is a modied form
of Yu et al. Scheme [24].
4.1 Framework of the Scheme
The Algorithm for the Modied Identity Based Signcryption scheme MIDGSC =
(Setup, KeyGenration, GSC, GUSC) consists of four algorithms which are:
• Setup (1k): This is a randomized algorithm run by PKG. Given a security
parameter k, this algorithm generates the system parameters params and
master secret key s and master public key mpk.
• KeyGenration (mpk;msk; ID): On input ID, PKG uses it to compute a
pair of corresponding public/private keys (SU ; QU).
• GSC: To send a message m from Sender S to the Receiver R, this
algorithm takes input (SS; IDR;m) and outputs signcrypted text  =
MIDGSC(SS; IDR;m).
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{ When IDS 6= ID; IDR 6= ID;   GSC(SS; QR;m) =
SC(SS; QR;m)
{ When IDS 6= ID; IDR = ID;   GSC(SS; QR;m) = Sign(SS;m)
{ When IDS = ID; IDR 6= ID;   GSC(SS; QR;m) =
Encrypt(QR;m)
• GUSC: This algorithm takes input (IDS; SR; ) and outputs m if  is a
valid Generalized Signcryption done by Sender S for Receiver R, otherwise
output false (?) if is not valid.
{ When IDS 6= ID; IDR 6= ID;m  GUSC(QS; SR; ) =
USC(QS; SR; )
{ When IDS 6= ID; IDR = ID; (T;?)  GUSC(QS; SR; ) =
V erify(SS; )
{ When IDS = ID; IDR 6= ID;m  GUSC(QS; SR; ) =
Decrypt(QR; )
The absence of specic sender or receiver are denoted by ID; ID instead of
IDS; IDR. When there is no specic sender(ID) we only encrypt the message m
using MIDGSC, when information about sender is not needed MIDGSC becomes
signature scheme and when both are there it will work as Signcryption scheme.
4.2 Description of the Scheme
Setup:Given a security parameter 1k, the PKG chooses two groups G1 and G2 of
prime order p, a random generator P of G1 and a bilinear map e : G1G1 ! G2,
three cryptographic hash functions as:
• H0 : f0; 1g ! Zp
• H1 : G2 ! Zp
• H2 : f0; 1g ! Zp
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Where,n denotes the number of bits to represent a message, PKG chooses a
random msk 2 Zp as master secret key and set mpk = mskP . A special function
f is dened as f(ID) = 0 if ID = ID, otherwise f(ID) = 1.(Assumptions
H1(1) = 1; H0(ID) = 0)). Also it is assumed that Q = 0.
PKG publishes the system parameters as as< G1; G2; p; n; P;mpk; f;H1; H2; H3 >.
KeyGenration: Given a user with identity IDU , its public key is QU = H0(IDU)
is a simple transformation of its Identity. The private key is generated by the PKG
as SU = sQU .
Generalized Signcryption(GSC): If the Sender S with Identity IDS has to
send a message to the Receiver R with identity IDR , it does as follows
• Computes f(IDS) and f(IDR)
• Selects r uniformly from Zp and computes
{ U  rP
{ W  e(mpk;QR)rf(IDR)
{ h1  H1(W )
{ h2  H2(U;W;m;QS; QR; IDS; IDR)
{ V  h2P + f(IDS)h1SS
{ X  rV
{ QR  H0(IDR)
{ y  m k IDS k X  h1f(IDR)
• Return(U,y)
Generalized UnSigncryption(GUSC): After Receiving(U,y) the receiver
computes
• f(IDR)
• W  e(U; SR)f(IDR)
• h1  H1(W )
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• m k IDS k X  h1f(IDR) y
• h2  H2(U;W;m;QS; QR; IDS; IDR)
Checks if e(P;X) 6= e(U; P )h2e(r  mpk; QS)h1f(IDS) return ? , else return m.
Consistency:
• W = e(mpk; QR)rf(IDR) = e(sP;QR)rf(IDR)
=e(P; sQR)
rf(IDR) = e(rP; SR)
f(IDR)
=e(U; SR)
f(IDR)
• e(P;X) = e(P; rV ) = e(rP; V )
=e(rP; h2P + f(IDS)h1SS)
=e(rP; h2P )e(rP; f(IDS)h1SS)
=e(U; P )h2e(rP; SS)
f(IDS)h1
= e(U; P )h2e(rP; sQS)
f(IDS)h1
=e(U; P )h2e(rsP;QS)
f(IDS)h1
=e(U; P )h2e(rmpk; QS)
f(IDS)h1
4.2.1 Correctness:
The three modes of the scheme are to be considered
• Signcryption Mode: In this case IDS 6= ID; IDR 6= ID, so f(IDS) =
f(IDR) = 1, and the scheme will act as Signcryption scheme. It can be
veried that:
{ W = e(mpk; QR)
r = e(sP;QR)
r
=e(P; sQR)
r = e(rP; SR) =e(U; SR)
{ e(P;X) = e(P; rV ) = e(rP; V )
=e(rP; h2P + h1SS)
=e(rP; h2P )e(rP; h1SS)
=e(U; P )h2e(rP; SS)
h1
= e(U; P )h2e(rP; sQS)
h1
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=e(U; P )h2e(rsP;QS)
h1
=e(U; P )h2e(rmpk; QS)
h1
• Signature Mode: In this mode IDS 6= ID; IDR = ID, that is
f(IDS) = 1; f(IDR) = 0. The Scheme will work as a Signature Scheme.
{ Sign:
Choose random r 2 Zp
Compute :
∗ U  rP
∗ W  e(mpk; QR)0 = 1
∗ h1  H1(1) = 1
∗ h2  H2(U; 1;m;QS; Q; IDS; ID)
∗ V  h2P + f(IDS)h1SS = h2P + SS
∗ X  rV
∗ QR  H0() = 0
∗ y  m k IDS k X  0 = m k IDS k X  0
Return(U,y)
{ Verify:
After Receiving (U,y) the receiver computes
∗ W  1
∗ h1  H1(1) = 1
∗ m k IDS k X = y  0
∗ h2  H2(U; 1;m;QS; Q; IDS; ID)
Check ife(P;X) 6= e(U; P )h2e(rmpk; QS)h1f(IDS) return ?
• Encryption Mode:In this mode IDS = ID; IDR 6= ID, that is
f(IDS) = 1; f(IDR) = 0. The Scheme will work as an Encryption Scheme.
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{ Encrypt:
∗ U  rP , W  e(mpk; QR)r
∗ h1  H1(W )
∗ h2  H2(U;W;m;Q; QR; ID; IDR)
∗ V  h2P + 0 = h2P
∗ X  rV
∗ QR  H0(IDR)
∗ y  m k 0 k X  h1
Return (U; y)
{ Decrypt:Computes f(IDR) and also Computes
∗ W  e(U; SR)
∗ h1  H1(W )
∗ m k 0 k X = h1  y
∗ h2  H2(U;W;m;Q; QR; ID; IDR)
Checks if e(P;X) 6= e(U; P )h2 return ?, else return m.
4.3 Eciency analysis
The basic purpose of generalized signcryption is to reduce implementation
complexity. As per need in dierent application environments, generalized
signcryption can fulll the function of signature, encryption or signcryption
respectively. However, the computational and communication cost may increase
compared with the normal signcryption schemes. The proposed scheme
signicantly reduces the extra computations and has comparable eciency as
compared to the existing ecient identity based signcryption schemes [12,32,33].
In Table 4.1 we compare the computational complexity of our scheme with several
other ecient existing signcryption schemes. Moreover, we compare our eciency
with other existing identity based generalized signcryption schemes [22, 24]. Our
scheme gives better performance as compared to IDGSC [22],and gives comparable
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eciency as compared to NIDGSC [24]. Also,the proposed scheme uses less
number of schemes as compared to other ID based generalized signcryption.
Table 4.1: Eciency Comparison with other Signcryption schemes
Schemes
Signcryption UnSigncryption
M E P M E P
Malone Lee's 3 0 0(+1) 0 1 3(+1)
Libert Quisquater's 2 2 0(+2) 0 2 3(+2)
X Boyen's 3 1 0(+1) 2 0 3(+1)
Chow et al.'s 2 0 0(+2) 1 0 4
Proposed Scheme 3 1 0(+1) 1 2 2(+2)
M: number of point multiplications in G1; E: number of exponentiation in G2;
P:number of pairing computations; (+): pre-computation of pairing.
The Table 4.1 shows that the proposed scheme has comparable eciency
as compared to other existing signcryption schemes. Almost with same
computational cost, the proposed can work as a signcryption scheme when both
condentiality and authentication are needed and as an encryption scheme or a
signature scheme when anyone them is needed.
Table 4.2: Eciency Comparison with other IDGSC schemes
Schemes
Generalized Signcryption Generalized UnSigncryption
M E P H M E P H
IDGSC 5 0 0(+1) 3 1 0 3(+1) 3
NIDGSC 3 1 0(+1) 4 0 2 2(+2) 3
Proposed Scheme 3 1 0(+1) 3 1 2 2(+2) 2
M: number of point multiplications in G1; E: number of exponentiation in G2;
P:number of pairing computations; H:number of hash function; (+):
pre-computation of pairing.
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The Table 4.2 shows that the proposed scheme has better eciency as compared
to the IDGSC,and has comparable eciency with respect NIDGSC. Overall as
compared to all the existing scheme the proposed scheme uses less no of Hashing
and hence it has got better eciency than other schemes.
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An improved Certicateless
Generalized Signcryption scheme
In this chapter, we have proposed an certicateless generalized signcryption scheme
based on Barbosa et al. certicateless signcryption scheme.
5.1 Framework of improved CLGSC
This scheme consists of six algorithms. First four of which are used for key
management operations.
1. Setup(1k):This is a global setup algorithm, which takes input the security
parameter 1k and returns the KGC's secret key msk and global parameters
params including a master public key mpk. This algorithm is executed by
the KGC, which publishes params.
2. Extract-partial-private-key (IDU ;msk; params): An algorithm which
takes input msk, params and a user identity IDU 2 f0; 1g and returns a
partial private key DU . This algorithm is run by KGC, after verifying the
users identity.
3. Generate-User-Keys (IDU ; params): An algorithm which takes input as
an identity and the public parameters and outputs a secret value x and a
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public key PK. This algorithm is run by a user to obtain a public key and a
secret value which will be used for constructing full private key. The public
key is published without certication.
4. Set-Private-Key (DU ; x; params): A deterministic algorithm which takes
as input a partial secret key DU and a secret value x and returns the full
private key SU . This algorithm is run by a user to construct a full private
key.
5. CLGSC (m;SS; IDR): This algorithm has three scenarios: signcryption
mode, signature only mode and encryption only mode.
• Signcryption Mode: If sender S transmits wants to transmit
a message m to receiver B such that both condentially and
authentication need to be maintained then the input is (m;SS; IDR),
and output is  = CLGSC(m;SS; IDR) = Singcrypt(m;SS; IDR).
• Signature only Mode: If sender S wants to send message m without
denite receiver, the input is (m;SS; ID), where ID means receiver
is null, the output is = CLGSC(m;SS; ID) = sign(m;SS).
• Encryption only Mode: If someone wants to send a message m to
a denite receiver R condentially, the input is (m;S; IDR), where S
means the receiver is null, the output is = encrypt(m; IDR).
6. CLGDSC (; IDS; IDR): After receiving , if it is valid, the receiver R
designcrypts (or decrypts) the ciphertext and returns the message m and
(or) the signature on m by S, otherwise return (?) means false.
5.2 Description of the Proposed CLGSC scheme
In this section we proposed a new CLGSC scheme based on the Certicateless
Signcryption scheme proposed in [Barbosa et. al] scheme.
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• Setup (1k): Given a security parameter k, the KGC chooses two groups
G1; G2 of prime order p, a random generator P of G1, a bilinear map e :
G1 G1 ! G2, four cryptographic hash functions as:
{ H1 : f0; 1g ! G1
{ H2 : f0; 1g ! f0; 1gn
{ H3 : f0; 1g ! G1
Where, n denotes the number of bits to represent a message. A special
function f is dened as f(ID) = 0, if ID = ID otherwise f(ID) = 1.
ID; PKand Sare parsed as strings of zero.KGC chooses a randommsk 2
Zp as master secret key and set mpk = mskP . KGC publishes the system
parameters as as< G1; G2; p; n; P;mpk; f;H1; H2; H3 >.
• Extract-Partial-Private-Key: Given a user with identity IDU , the
partial private key is computed by KGC as DU = mskQU = mskH1(IDU).
• Generate-User-Keys: Given DU , the user with identity IDU chooses a
random xU 2 Zp and sets its public key PKU = xUP and Private Key
SU =< xU ; DU >.
• CLGSC (m; IDS; IDR; SS; PKS; PKR;mpk)
1. Computes f(IDS) and f(IDR),Selects r uniformly from Z

p
2. Compute
{ U  rP , T  e(mpk;QR)rf(IDR)
{ h H2(U; T; rPKR; IDS; IDR; PKS; PKR)f(IDR)
{ V  m h
{ H  H3(U; V; IDS; IDR; PKS; PKR)
{ W  f(IDS)[DS + xSH] + rH
3. Return   (U; V;W )
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• CLGDSC (; IDS; IDR; SS; PKS; PKR;mpk) After Receiving  from
Sender S, the receiver R parses  as U,V,W and
1. Computes f(IDR); f(IDS)
2. Computes H  H3(U; V; IDS; IDR; PKS; PKR)f(IDR)
3. Check if e(P;W ) 6= e(mpk;QS)f(IDS)e(U + PKS; H) return ? else
computes
{ T  (U;DR), parse SR as (xR; DR)
{ h H2(U; T; xRU; IDS; IDR; PKS; PKR)
{ m V  h
4. Return m
• Consistency:
{ T = e(U;DR) = e(rP;mskQR) = e(rP;QR)
msk = e(r msk  P;QR) =
e(r mpk;QR) = e(mpk;QR)r
{ e(P;W ) = e(P;DS+xS H+rH) = e(P;mskH1(IDS))e((r+xS)P;H) =
e(mskP;H1(IDS))e(U + PKS; H) = e(mpk;QS)e(U + PKS; H)
5.2.1 Adaptability and Correctness:
CLGSC is an adaptive scheme and can work as Signcryption scheme, Signature
Scheme and Encryption Scheme depending on the need whether Condentiality
and Authentication are needed simultaneously or individually, without any other
additional operation.
• Signcryption Mode: When IDS 6= ID; IDR 6= IDthenf(IDS) =
1; f(IDR) = 1, the algorithm runs in signcryption mode.
• Signature only Mode: When IDS 6= ID; IDR = IDthenf(IDS) =
1; f(IDR) = 0; the algorithm runs in signature mode. For this the CLGSC
and CLGDSC becomes
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{ CL-Signature (m; IDS; ID; SS; PKS; PK;mpk)
∗ U = rP; T = 1,h = 0; V = m 0 = m
∗ H = H3(U; V; IDS; ID; PKS; PK)
∗ W = f(IDS)[DS] + xSH] + rH
Return   (U;m;W ), where (U;W ) is the signature on m
{ CL-Verify(; IDS; ID; SR; PKS; ID;mpk)
On receiving U,m,W the receiver computes
∗ H = H3(U;m; IDS; ID; PKS; ID)
∗ Verify if e(P;W ) 6= e(mpk;QS)f(IDS)e(U + PKS; H) return ? else
accept the message.
• Encryption only Mode:When IDS = ID; IDR 6= ID then f(IDS) =
0; f(IDR) = 1, the algorithm runs in encryption mode. CLGSC and
CLGDSC becomes:
{ CL-Encrypt(m; ID; IDR; S; PK; PKR;mpk)
∗ U = rP , T  e(mpk;QR)r
∗ h = H2(U; T; rPKR; ID; IDR; ID; PKR)
∗ V  m h
∗ H  H3(U; V; ID; IDR; PK; PKR)
∗ W  0[DS + xSH] + rH=rH
Return   (U; V;W ).
{ CL-Decryption(; ID; IDR; S; PK;mpk) on receiving U,m,W the
receiver computes
∗ H = H3(U; V; ; IDR; ; PKR)
∗ if e(P;W ) 6= 1e(U + 0; H) 6= e(U;H) return ? else computes
· T = e(U;DR), parse SR as (xR; DR)
· h H2(U; T; xRU; ID; IDR; PK; PKR)
· m V  h
Return m
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5.3 Eciency Analysis
Computation time and ciphertext size are two important parameters aecting the
eciency of a cryptographic scheme. We present a comparison of our scheme with
other existing CLGSC schemes with respect to these parameters.
Table 5.1: Eciency Comparison with Certicateless Signcryption Scheme
Schemes Ciphertext Size
Signcryption DeSigncryption
E M P H E M P H
Barbosa et al. Scheme 2jG1j+ jmj 1 4 0(+1) 3 0 1 4(+1) 3
Proposed Scheme 2jG1j+ jmj 1 4 0(+1) 3 0 1 4(+1) 3
M: number of point multiplications in G1; E: number of exponentiation in G2;
P:number of pairing computations; H:number of hash function; (+):
pre-computation of pairing; jG1j:Size of an element in G1 ; jG2j:Size of an
element in G2; jmj:length of message m; jIDj:length of identity; jpj:Size of an
element inZp .
The Table 5.1 shows that Barbosa et al.'s signcryption scheme [34] has the
same ciphertext size and eciency as our scheme. That means both the schemes
have the same Computation Complexity and Communication Complexity. But
in terms of implementation complexity our scheme is a better than rst one
because, Barbosa et al.'s Certicateless Signcryption [34] Scheme cannot work
as signature only or encryption only mode, but our scheme can adaptively work
as a signcryption scheme when both condentiality and authentication are needed
and as an encryption scheme or a signature scheme when anyone them is needed.
M: number of point multiplications in G1; E: number of exponentiation in G2;
P:number of pairing computations; H:number of hash function; (+):
pre-computation of pairing; jG1j:Size of an element in G1 ; jG2j:Size of an
element in G2; jmj:length of message m; jIDj:length of identity; jpj:Size of an
element inZp .
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Table 5.2: Eciency Comparison with other CLGSC Schemes
Schemes Ciphertext Size
GSC GDSC
E M P H E M P H
Ji et al. [26] 2jG1j+ jmj+ jIDj+ jG2j+ jP j 3 2 0 4 1 1 2 4
Kushwah et al. [27] 2jG1j+ jmj+ jIDj+ jG2j 2 3 0 3 1 3 2 3
Zhou et al. [28] 2jG1j+ jmj 1 4 0(+1) 3 0 1 4(+1) 3
Proposed Scheme 2jG1j+ jmj 1 4 0(+1) 2 0 1 4(+1) 2
The Table 5.2 shows that the proposed scheme has smaller text size as compared
to rst two schemes but has same size as third scheme. But as compared to all
the existing scheme our scheme uses less no of Hashing and hence it has got better
eciency than other schemes.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Conclusion and Future Work
Generalized Signcryption is a multi functional single subroutine which
can adaptively work as an encryption scheme or a signcryption scheme
or a signcryption scheme. It is Suitable for resource constrained
environment like: Adhoc Networks, WSNs, Mobile Computing and Ubiquitous
Computing,Embedded Systems. According to the comparison to other schemes,
the proposed schemes are ecient. Due to the Computation of the pairing being
still time consuming the schemes can be further improved by reducing no of pairing
operations at the same time maintaining the eciency. Finally, the proposed
scheme can also be extended for multiuser environment, broadcast communication.
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